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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ as 
a potentially inclusive and real-world responsive way of under-
standing Indigenous citizenship in a non-ideal world. The paper 
draws on Melissa Williams’ work on ‘citizenship as shared fate,’ and 
assesses some of the benefits and drawbacks of using this notion to 
understand citizenship in Indigenous and modern state contexts. In 
particular, the paper focuses on the challenges that existing non- 
ideal circumstances – past and enduring injustices and unequal 
power relations – bring to the understanding of ‘citizenship as 
shared fate’, and the normative constraints for realizing such citi-
zenship in our contemporary world. By developing this notion in 
light of Indigenous claims for justice, the paper proposes three side 
constraints to the notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate,’ including its 
openness to different views of history, the role of history in shaping 
the future, and acknowledging – and countering – prevailing power 
relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. The 
paper concludes by looking at some of the implications of the 
reconceptualized notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ for the shap-
ing of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations in the Nordic/Sápmi 
context.
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I. Introduction
Citizenship, within Western liberal theory, is often viewed as a specific type of rights- 
conferring membership within a specific type of political unit (typically, although not 
exclusively, a sovereign state). Such citizenship-membership can be seen to incorporate 
three elements: legal status and rights, citizen participation, and shared citizen identity 
(cf. Leydet 2017).1 These elements constitute the backbone of the special relation between 
the citizens and the state, and form a unique bond among a common citizenry.
From an Indigenous perspective, and also the rights of Indigenous peoples outlined in 
international law (incl. UN 1992; UNDRIP 2007; ILO 1989), traditional Western liberal 
understandings of citizenship are problematic for a number of reasons. As demonstrated 
by the history of colonialism, Indigenous peoples have not always been included as equal 
citizens within the state that came to occupy them, and once they were, the inclusion was 
mostly done on unjust terms (Turner 2000). Indigenous peoples suffer from a variety of 
historical, and enduring (Spinner-Halev 2012), injustices that question the presumed 
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equality of citizenship for Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike. Indigenous 
peoples’ self-understandings of citizenship are often markedly different from Western 
liberal understandings.2 This is both in terms of their substance (what citizenship entails 
and how membership is established (cf. Gover 2017)) and in terms of those political units 
to which citizenship is attached (Indigenous nations vs. modern states). Typically, though 
it has not always been the case, Indigenous peoples are simultaneously citizens of modern 
states (e.g. Norway, Sweden, Finland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and Indigenous 
nations (e.g. the Sápmi, First Nations, Inuit, Métis, and other Indigenous/Aboriginal 
nations), thus creating a distinctively dual, or multiple,3 citizenship for Indigenous 
peoples. Somewhat unsurprisingly, Western liberal theories have struggled to accommo-
date this dual or multiple character of Indigenous citizenship without reinforcing the 
inherently hierarchical (and thus, in many senses, colonial) understandings of 
citizenship.4 While contemporary liberal political theories5 commonly recognize the 
right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination, and thus also to citizenship- 
membership of Indigenous nations, this membership is often viewed as secondary, or 
additional, to the citizenship of the modern state.6 While listening to Indigenous voices 
and incorporating Indigenous scholarship within the broad canon of political theory has 
become more common,7 much literature on citizenship (including Indigenous citizen-
ship) remains grounded in traditional Western liberal theory.8 Partially, this may be seen 
as reflecting the unequal power relations within academia, although it may also be due to 
what has now become known as ‘the Kymlickan constraint.’9 That is, the view that, in 
a world where many of those with power to decide on Indigenous issues (judges, main-
stream politicians, etc.) are non-Indigenous, there is a need to justify Indigenous peoples’ 
rights in a language that those with power understand – i.e. within the dominant Western 
liberal framework. While this, of course, may reflect an even more widespread power 
imbalance in society, it also operates as one of the starting points of this paper. 
Furthermore, while I recognize the need for a liberal justification of Indigenous rights 
for such practical purposes, I also think that liberal theory – and Western liberal 
approaches to citizenship – would be all the worse for not being able to incorporate 
Indigenous citizenship, and its specific characteristics, into its own theoretical frame-
work. This, of course, may not be possible without listening to Indigenous voices and 
Indigenous scholarship on citizenship. I, therefore, aim to make a modest – albeit no 
doubt still insufficient – attempt to do this towards the end of this paper.
Having said that, my focus and starting-point in this paper comes from within 
Western liberal political theory, attempting to reconceptualize citizenship from 
a potentially exclusive and homogenizing notion of ‘citizenship as shared identity’ to 
an alternative notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate.’ This notion, as developed by Melissa 
Williams (2003, 2004, 2010),10 aims to acknowledge the dual or multiple nature of 
Indigenous citizenship, while being sensitive to the fact that people may have very 
different, even conflicting, views of what such citizenship entails or how it has come 
about. In this sense, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ aims to be responsive to the non-ideal 
circumstances of the contemporary world. While I argue, along with Williams, that the 
notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ can respond to at least some of the challenges that 
a conflictual and contested view of citizenship entails, I also argue that it insufficiently 
recognizes the non-ideal nature of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations. Recent litera-
ture on Indigenous claims for justice, including its focus on not only rectifying past 
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injustices, but also the ongoing need to counter persistent forms of colonialism that 
Indigenous peoples continue to encounter (Alfred 2009; Couthard 2014; Simpson 
2017),11 provides important insights on why this is the case. By developing Williams’ 
account further, I argue that, in order to be genuinely responsive to the non-ideal 
circumstances – including the past and enduring injustices as well as the existing 
inequalities of power – certain normative side constraints need to apply. These side 
constraints – including limits to the legitimate range of disagreement – have important 
implications for the ways in which Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations are shaped, for 
example in political decision-making, or in the shared spaces of citizenship education.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part II briefly outlines the notion of ‘citizenship as 
shared fate’ and identifies three of its distinctive benefits in relation to existing disagree-
ments and differing viewpoints on Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations. In part III, 
I discuss these benefits in light of Indigenous claims for justice, analyzing the extent to 
which ‘citizenship as shared fate’ is, in fact, responsive to the non-ideal circumstances of 
the contemporary world. In particular, I focus on the potential difficulties ‘citizenship as 
shared fate’ has when both historical and present power relations are taken into account. 
I propose three normative side constraints to overcome these difficulties: (1) the limits on 
the legitimate range of disagreement on the contents of history, (2) the role of history for 
future cooperation, and (3) the acknowledgment – and countering – of the prevailing 
relations of power between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. I end, in part IV, by 
looking at some of the implications of this new, normatively constrained notion of 
citizenship as shared fate through an examination of the Nordic/Sápmi context.
II. Citizenship as shared fate
The notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ has been developed as an alternative to the 
traditional ‘shared identity’ theories of citizenship and their marginalizing, homogeniz-
ing, and assimilationist tendencies. According to Melissa Williams (2003, 2004, 2010), 
‘citizenship as shared fate’ aims to respond to changing circumstances related to our 
globalized world, where people’s political memberships are not exclusively tied to nation- 
states. ‘Citizenship as shared fate’ aims to capture both the temporality and plurality of 
political membership by acknowledging that people are often members of many political 
communities, with different, and changing, political loyalties. In relation to Indigenous 
peoples, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ aims to capture the notion that Indigenous peoples 
and the state’s majority population (herein: national majority) live in complex, histori-
cally formed, interdependent relations that unavoidably tie their fates together. As 
opposed to the shared identity theories of citizenship, the understanding of citizenship 
in terms of shared fate envisages Indigenous peoples and the national majority as sharing 
a common bond, as being interconnected by a variety of historical and present circum-
stances, while keeping their own distinctive identities.
The benefits of understanding citizenship in terms of shared fate – as opposed to 
shared (thick or thin) identity – relate both to the apparent inclusivity of this notion as 
well as to its practical and future-looking orientation. Contrary to both ‘ethnic-national’ 
and ‘civic national/political liberal’12 notions of citizenship, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ 
does not require the citizenry to be of certain ethnicity or to be committed to a certain set 
of substantive, e.g. religious, values (ethnic nationalism), or to a set of thin, political 
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values or institutions supposedly governed by these values (political liberalism). Less 
demandingly, all they need to be committed to is a common realization of their inter-
connectedness and interdependency, which now ties their fates together (Williams 2003: 
229–233, 2004, 103–109). By virtue of this shared fate, the different groups in society (in 
this case, Indigenous peoples and the national majority) also realize that they need to 
cooperate, now and in the future, with each other.
From the perspective of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations, these benefits of ‘citi-
zenship as shared fate’ can be further categorized into three groups: ‘neutrality 1 – non- 
normative status quo’ benefit; ‘neutrality 2a & 2b – no overriding identity & no overriding 
loyalty’ benefits; and ‘3 – plurality of citizenship’ benefit. I discuss each in turn before 
moving on to part II where I problematize certain normative implications of these 
benefits in contemporary non-ideal circumstances.
‘Neutrality 1 – non-normative status quo’. As a first benefit of understanding citizen-
ship in terms of shared fate (as opposed to shared identity), let us look at the ways in 
which ‘citizenship as shared fate’ can be viewed as a primarily descriptive and practical, 
rather than an inherently normative notion.13 ‘Citizenship as shared fate’ aims to capture 
the idea that Indigenous peoples and the national majority live in complex, historically 
formed, interdependent relations that tie their fates together. Indigenous peoples and the 
national majority share common historical, institutional, material, etc. bonds, although 
they may not necessarily agree upon how these bonds and webs of interconnection have 
been formed, or how their existing relations and interconnections should be developed 
further.
There are several potential advantages of a descriptive and practical notion of 
citizenship when it comes to Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations. First, ‘citizenship 
as shared fate’ requires no unified understanding of history – of how the status quo 
came into being – but a much weaker realization that, in the world that we live in, the 
fates of the Indigenous peoples and the majority population are intertwined. This is 
important, as Indigenous peoples and the national majority may still have somewhat 
different understandings of history, and a requirement for a perfect convergence of 
these understandings may be too demanding, and thus also a hindrance, rather than 
a benefit, for the two groups to work together. (I will return to the extent to which 
some such convergence may nevertheless be required in Section III.) Second, being 
a primarily descriptive and practical notion, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ does not rest on 
any particular understanding of the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the current status 
quo, but allows for different interpretations both of the legitimacy of the current 
institutional structures, and a level of openness to how these structures should be 
developed in the future. In an important way, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ is also 
a forward-looking notion that emphasizes the need for the Indigenous peoples and 
the national majority to work together – from the circumstances of the present – as 
they realize that their fates are intricately connected. While Indigenous peoples and the 
national majority do not need to completely agree on the circumstances that have led to 
the present situation, or the legitimacy of the status quo, they nevertheless need to 
realize that their lives are, in the present circumstances, complexly connected, and that 
their fates are thus tied together. By coming to this realization, Indigenous peoples and 
the majority population also realize that they need to cooperate, although the terms of 
such cooperation are largely left open.
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‘Neutrality 2a – no overriding identity’ & ‘2b – no overriding loyalty.’ Being primarily 
practical and descriptive, rather than a normative notion, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ 
creates no normative requirements for Indigenous peoples and the national majority to 
share a common identity, or an overriding loyalty to those institutions they are presently 
governed by. This has certain advantages, especially from an Indigenous perspective, as 
they need not prioritize their membership in a modern state (e.g. Norway, Finland) over 
their membership in an Indigenous nation (e.g. Sápmi). Due to historical circumstances, 
including high levels of distrust, Indigenous peoples may well have good reasons not to 
support or fully endorse prevailing state institutions, or to offer their loyalty to the state 
over their own Indigenous communities. Rather, in accordance with the notion of 
‘citizenship as shared fate,’ Indigenous peoples can also challenge the workings and the 
legitimacy of prevailing institutional structures, although they cannot deny the fact that, 
as things stand, these structures have a profound effect on the their lives and the lives of 
members of the national majority alike.
‘3 – Plurality of citizenship.’ The two benefits mentioned above – the non-normative 
view of the status quo (1), and the lack of requirement for a common identity (2a) or 
overriding loyalty (2b) – bring us to the third potential benefit of the ‘citizenship as 
shared fate’ view, which is the possibility for multiple political spaces, and for multiple 
citizenships that need not be in opposition to one another. As described by Williams, 
‘citizenship as shared fate’ aims to respond to the concrete circumstances of the globa-
lized world where people are often members of several political communities with 
changing political identities and loyalties. In the case of Indigenous peoples – and 
especially in the light of the already existing international recognition of Indigenous self- 
determination – this reality of multiple political memberships is particularly visible. 
Indigenous peoples are, in accordance with the international law, citizens of both 
a modern state (e.g. Norway, Finland etc.) and an Indigenous nation (e.g. Sápmi), with 
varying political identities and loyalties, both between Indigenous persons and for any 
particular person depending on the existing circumstances at any particular time.14 
Contrary to many Western liberal, including ethnic national and political liberal, under-
standings of citizenship in terms of shared identity and loyalty, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ 
does not require Indigenous peoples to fix their political loyalties or give priority to their 
modern state identities (or to Indigenous identities for that matter) should there be 
a conflict between the two. In this sense, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ aims to cater to the 
dual nature of Indigenous citizenship by allowing it to be non-conflictual and non- 
hierarchical, as citizenship is no longer understood in terms of overriding (substantive or 
political) identities or loyalties to the political unit to which the citizenship is attached. 
The possibility of Indigenous peoples being citizens of both the modern state and an 
Indigenous nation, without an inherent hierarchy or conflict between the two, is built 
into the notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate,’ thus supporting Indigenous peoples 
opportunities to exercise their citizenship in both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
/shared political spaces.
III. Shared fate and non-ideal circumstances
My focus thus far has been on some of the benefits of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ for 
envisioning Indigenous citizenship as a specific type of dual or multiple citizenship. As 
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a descriptive and practical notion, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ aims to be responsive to 
real-world circumstances and, based on these circumstances, cater to the future. In this 
sense, Williams’ notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ is responsive to certain non-ideal 
features of the world – including the Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples’ different, 
at times even conflicting, understandings of history, and the need to cooperate from the 
circumstances that the two parties might, or might not, find as legitimate. While such 
responsiveness, and forward-lookingness, no doubt makes ‘citizenship as shared fate’ an 
attractive notion, it may nevertheless be questioned whether ‘citizenship as shared fate,’ 
as described by Williams, goes all the way in our non-ideal world – i.e. whether it 
manages not only to respond and adjust to the real-world circumstances, but also counter 
some of the non-ideal effects of these circumstances. In this section, I aim to show that, in 
order to do the work it is supposed to do, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ needs to be 
constrained in a number of ways. By discussing potential problems with ‘citizenship as 
shared fate’ – in particular, its relation to history, agency, and power – I aim to develop 
Williams’ account further. By utilizing James Tully’s work, and by mirroring this to 
Indigenous claims for justice, I argue for three substantive constraints to the ‘citizenship 
as shared fate’ view before (in part IV) discussing some of the practical implications of 
these side constraints in the Nordic/Sápmi context.
The problem of history and agency. As noted in the previous section, one of the benefits 
of understanding citizenship in terms of shared fate is its apparent neutrality when it 
comes to the existing circumstances, and the ways in which the status quo has come into 
being. ‘Citizenship as shared fate’ provides no predetermined views of the (il)legitimacy 
of prevailing social, political, or institutional structures, but instead views these structures 
as the inevitable starting points from which cooperation between non-Indigenous and 
Indigenous peoples needs to begin. The advantages of this view are twofold. First, it 
allows for different interpretations of how the two groups have come to occupy their 
current positions without sacrificing their willingness to cooperate. Second, it focuses on 
the ways in which cooperation can be developed in the future – from the situation of 
today – thus being both forward looking and pragmatic. Regardless of the (il)legitimacy 
of the current situation, or the ways in which this situation has come about, the existing 
institutions, social relations, and power hierarchies constitute the de facto framework 
from which cooperation between the two groups – at this very moment – needs to 
begin.15
It may, however, be questioned whether this forward-looking and pragmatic focus of 
‘citizenship as shared fate’ can sufficiently take into account the role of history and 
human agency in bringing about the current state of affairs. As shown by a number of 
Indigenous (as well as non-Indigenous) scholars, the history of Indigenous/non- 
Indigenous relations is a history of domination and active suppression of Indigenous 
peoples and cultures that continues to shape the relations between the two groups to date. 
This does not, of course, take away the need to look into the future, and to develop 
distinctively forward-looking, as well as pragmatic, models for Indigenous/non- 
Indigenous cooperation, although these models must be adequately responsive to the 
effects of history and human agency in the forming of these relations. Recent scholarship 
on distinctively Indigenous forms of activism and resistance (Alfred 2009; Coulthard 
2014; Simpson 2011, 2017; Kuokkanen 2019) all share this feature of being distinctively 
forward-looking, while being also responsive to the effects of the past and to persistent 
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forms of oppression and structural injustice experienced by Indigenous peoples. 
Furthermore, as contemporary forms of oppression have become more subtle – being 
ingrained in the social, economic and political structures of society (Coulthard 2014, 
48) – it becomes all the more important to understand how the events of history, 
including the recent reconciliatory attempts of liberal states, have helped to maintain 
these forms of oppression and power inequalities. As such, one of the main normative 
bases for Indigenous claims for justice lies precisely in the effects history and in the 
variety of historical, as well as enduring, injustices that Indigenous peoples have experi-
enced and continue to experience.16 Given the specific historical embeddedness of 
Indigenous claims for justice, as well as the majority population’s role as perpetrators, 
and beneficiaries, of these injustices, there may not be much that can be said in defense of 
a view that would deliberately aim to sideline or downplay these historical facts.
To be fair to most, including Williams and her understanding of ‘citizenship as shared 
fate,’ such a critique about ignoring the role of history may, however, be exaggerated. 
Understanding citizenship in terms of shared fate does not mean that one should (or 
even could) be ignorant of history, although it does require certain sensitivity towards, 
and realism about, the fact that, in our non-ideal world, different groups may not always 
agree on all aspects of history. This is also recognized by James Tully (1995, 2008) in his 
groundbreaking work on modern constitutionalism and multinational democracy, and 
in his development of normative constraints for Indigenous/non-Indigenous dialogue. 
As Tully explicitly recognizes, Indigenous and non-Indigenous understandings of history 
may differ, although they do, at least for the most part, share an understanding of this 
history as a one of partnership, a shared life (Tully 2008, 241). Furthermore, while 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous views of history sometimes diverge, their dialogue and 
cooperation must, according to Tully, be based on the two groups’ mutual recognition as 
equal, coexisting and self-governing peoples and cultures (Tully 2008, 229–235). It is only 
via such mutual recognition, and the presumption of equal status, that the two groups 
can engage in fruitful dialogue and cooperation, and also come closer to understanding 
each other’s viewpoints and the ways in which their mutual relations should move 
forward.
Similar ideals of mutual recognition and respect are also present in Williams’ work, 
especially in her discussions on common citizenship education (esp. Williams 2003). For 
Williams, citizenship education operates as one of the cornerstones of Indigenous/non- 
Indigenous relations, aiming to enable and nurture the two groups’ common striving for 
cooperation, and to unfold the historical connections and webs of interconnection that 
now bind their fates together. Such education, while acknowledging the two parties’ 
different starting points and views of history, is nevertheless based on the ideal of mutual 
respect and dialogue through which Indigenous peoples and the national majority aim to 
understand each other’s viewpoints. By virtue of such dialogue, they also come closer to 
a common (albeit not necessarily perfect) understanding of how their histories have 
unfolded and how their fates have become intertwined. For Williams, ‘citizenship as 
shared fate’ should thus be understood as a process through which the two parties 
interact, learn from one another and, by virtue of such learning, also develop their 
ways of cooperating with each other.
While I believe that such characterization of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ as a real-world 
sensitive process for cooperation has certain advantages (not least in its reconciliatory 
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approach to different views of history), it may not, however, go all the way in refuting the 
initial concerns expressed. Most of all, this includes largely ignoring, or at least margin-
alizing, the role of history and human agency in Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations. 
I believe this to be the case in at least two senses.
Firstly, while ‘citizenship as shared fate’ may thus be seen as nurturing the strive of 
Indigenous peoples and the majority population towards a common understanding of 
history, there is nothing in the notion itself that would guide the two parties in terms of 
how such historical facts should affect their cooperation in the future. Even with 
a (roughly) common understanding of how history has unfolded – including the 
acknowledgment of past and enduring injustices – the two parties may still disagree on 
how these injustices should be addressed and what role (if any) they should play in 
developing Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations into the future. Recall that, for 
Williams, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ is primarily a descriptive and forward-looking 
notion that provides no predetermined judgments about the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) 
of the status quo, nor – I should add – of the ways in which the reaching of such status 
quo (i.e. the effects of the past) should be dealt with in the future. Being thus, the parties 
can disagree on the ways in which the current state of affairs has come about (i.e. the 
contents of history), although they can also disagree on the effects that this history should 
have for their present and future cooperation (i.e. the role of history). And while it may 
well be true that at least some practical acceptance of the present is needed for the 
cooperation of the two groups to succeed, there is no doubt that the understandings of 
the past will – and also should – affect the cooperative arrangements that Indigenous 
peoples and the national majority come to develop. Notably, many Indigenous claims for 
justice precisely claimed to rectify past, and enduring, injustices – a task that, in the face 
of too wide disagreement, may never lift off the ground.
Secondly, and perhaps even more concerning, there is little that the descriptive and 
practical characterization of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ may do in order to adequately 
acknowledge – and counter – the effects of the prevailing power relations between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. As described by a number of scholars, as well 
as political activists, the history of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations is a history of 
domination and power that continues to distort the ways in which relations between the 
two groups are presently constructed. In many cases, Indigenous peoples have – due to 
these historical circumstances – become far more dependent on the majority population 
than the opposite, and the interconnections and mutual dependencies, acknowledged by 
the ‘citizenship as shared fate’ view, are heavily power laden and asymmetric.17 These 
power relations, I believe, create yet further preconditions that the two parties must 
accept in order for ‘citizenship as shared fate’ to perform the task it is supposed to 
perform, that is, to cater for fruitful, genuinely inclusive and fair cooperation between the 
two parties without requiring perfect agreement on the terms or the background condi-
tions of such cooperation.
While the notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ may thus allow (and rightly so) for 
a certain degree of disagreement between Indigenous and non-Indigenous understand-
ings of history, it is clear that too much disagreement – e.g. concerning the parties’ views 
on who the perpetrators, victims, beneficiaries, or those disadvantaged are – will make 
the envisioned cooperation futile. In order to counter these effects, I have already 
proposed two constraints to the legitimate range of disagreement: one having to do 
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with the contents of history, another with the two groups’ views on the normative weight 
of history for the future. In the case of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations, the two 
groups must thus agree – at the very minimum – on some of the basics on the direction of 
power via which their relations of interdependence have come into being, as well as on 
the fact that this history should also have some normative weight in the designing of their 
future cooperation (although the finer details of both the content and role of history may 
remain contested).
While such constraints on the acceptable range of disagreement may already do much 
of the work needed for the ‘citizenship as shared fate’ to respond to some of the non-ideal 
circumstances, they are not sufficient. As Williams argues, the two groups’ commitment 
to cooperate is based on their common realization that their lives are interconnected and 
that they are, in numerous ways, dependent on one another. Importantly, however, this 
point of realization and interdependency – the status quo – is far from an ideal, neutral 
starting point for Indigenous/non-Indigenous cooperation. On the contrary, it is heavily 
power laden and asymmetric, both in the sense of Indigenous peoples typically being 
more dependent on the national majority than the other way around, and in the sense in 
which the two groups’ voices are being heard and given weight in the process of 
cooperation.
James Tully’s work may again illustrate some of the problems (as well as possible 
solutions) ingrained in such power-asymmetries. As Tully notes, there is no ideal starting 
point for Indigenous/non-Indigenous cooperation; no ideal speech situation for 
Indigenous/non-Indigenous dialogue to take place (Tully 2008, 240–241). Rather, the 
situation from which the two groups ‘begin to discuss their ways of cooperation in the 
future [. . .] is shot through with relations of inequality, force and fraud, broken promises, 
failed accords, degrading stereotypes, misrecognition, paternalism, enmity and distrust’ 
(Tully 2008, 240). This does not, of course, take away some of the elements of peace, 
goodwill, or friendship that Indigenous peoples and the majority population may also 
have come to experience, although it does highlight the fact that, despite a mutual 
commitment to cooperate, this cooperation does not happen on equal terms. On the 
contrary, existing power relations and asymmetries of dependency create a situation in 
which the dominant group (national majority) is far more likely to get its views heard and 
interests furthered. At worst, the existing power relations may reduce ‘citizenship as 
shared fate’ into a one-sided exercise of power, where one group is able to dictate and 
enforce its understanding of history under the guise of mutual cooperation.
Neither Tully nor Williams are, of course, ignorant of existing power relations, and 
they also point to some ways in which power imbalances could be addressed. Tully’s 
broader normative commitments to viewing the two groups as equal, coexisting and, self- 
governing peoples (Tully 2008, 229–235) already provides some principled constraints to 
the ways in which the two groups should, normatively speaking, relate to one another. 
Recognizing each other as equals does not, however, mean that the background struc-
tures within which such recognition takes place could not be unequal in many other 
ways.18 Thus, it is not enough that Indigenous peoples and the national majority commit 
to viewing each other as equals, listening and learning from one another. They must also 
recognize that, as things stand, their relations are de facto relations of asymmetrical 
power and dependency. Furthermore, they must also recognize the possible implications 
of these power imbalances and find ways to avoid (or at least mediate) the ensuing 
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implications. This may happen, for example, by developing avenues for Indigenous 
voices and viewpoints in public institutions, or by prioritizing Indigenous perspectives, 
or reserving the decision power of certain institutions solely to Indigenous agents (see 
also Williams 2004; Tully 2008, 212–215). While I will come back to more concrete 
examples of such measures in Section IV, for the purposes of my current conceptual 
analysis of ‘citizenship as shared fate,’ the following applies. In order to be genuinely 
inclusive and responsive to non-ideal circumstances – including past and present power 
relations – there must be constraints, not only on the legitimate range of disagreement 
concerning the contents and role of history, but also on the two parties’ understanding of 
their present situation. That is, their commitment to cooperation on equal and mutually 
respectful terms must be complemented by an acknowledgment that their current 
positions are not equal, and that their cooperation is thus tainted by the existing inequal-
ities of power. Without such acknowledgment, ‘citizenship as shared fate’ is in danger of 
turning into another tool of oppression while maintaining its commitment to equality in 
Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations.
IV Some practical implications
I wish to end this paper by looking at some of the implications that ‘citizenship as shared 
fate,’ and the three normative side constraints developed in the previous section, may 
have when applied to contemporary, non-ideal circumstances. Some of these implica-
tions, it should be noted, are also discussed by Williams and Tully, although, in contrast 
to their focus on the Northern American (esp. Canadian) context, I wish to address the 
issue in the Nordic/Sápmi context. Being often viewed as one of the relative success 
stories of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations, I aim to show how the notion of ‘citizen-
ship as shared fate’ can already be seen as partially operational in the Nordic/Sápmi 
context, and how the new, normatively constrained notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ 
could be used to improve Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations further.
Before embarking on such a task, a few words about the relatively unique situation of 
the Indigenous Sámi are in order. The Sámi are Indigenous peoples whose traditional 
lands (the Sápmi Nation) extend across the northern territories of Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and Russia (Kola Peninsula). Traditional modes of living, such as reindeer 
herding, are common among the Sámi communities, although many Sámi have also 
opted for less traditional professions and live alongside their fellow (Norwegian, Swedish, 
Finnish19) countrymen in towns and villages both within and outside traditional Sámi 
territories.20 What makes the Sámi – and Sámi citizenship – relatively unique is the way 
in which it transcends the borders of both modern states (Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Russia) as well as of state unions (e.g. the Sámi of Finland and Sweden are also citizens of 
the European Union, while the Sámi of Norway and Russia are not).21 The institutional 
structures protecting the rights of the Sámi in each state vary somewhat. While the three 
Nordic countries have all relatively well functioning Sámi parliaments, these operate 
under the independent legal frameworks of each state. The four states are also in different 
stages when it comes to their commitment to the international legal frameworks for 
Indigenous rights protection. As it stands, Norway remains the only country that has 
signed ILO169, and the three Nordic countries (but not Russia) have given their explicit 
support to the principles of the UNDRIP. The Draft Nordic Sámi Convention (2005) also 
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regulates the Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations of the Sámi in the Nordic countries, 
with an exclusion of the Sámi in Russia.
Being one Indigenous peoples22 whose traditional territories transcend modern state 
borders and whose individual members are thus citizens of different (modern) states, the 
Sámi provide an interesting test case for how ‘citizenship as shared fate’ could be used to 
understand, and to develop Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations further. Much of what 
follows will be based on Else Grete Broderstad’s work on the political spaces of the 
Indigenous (esp. Norwegian) Sámi, and the ways in which Williams’ notion of ‘citizen-
ship as shared fate’ can be used to conceptualize these spaces within the Norwegian/Sámi 
context. By developing Broderstad’s work further, I aim to show how the three normative 
constraints discussed in the previous section alter the model of Indigenous/non- 
Indigenous cooperation, both in terms of how this cooperation is described, and how 
it should, normatively speaking, be constructed.
In her work on Indigenous/non-Indigenous political spaces, Broderstad (2008, 2014) 
utilizes Williams’ notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ in order to build a model through 
which different political spaces of Indigenous/non-Indigenous engagement can be 
understood. According to Broderstad, it is useful to think of relations between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples by analyzing their involvement and interaction 
within the two existing systems of political governance: Indigenous autonomy and self- 
governance (as practiced e.g. by the Sámi parliament), and the broader political system of 
the state as a whole (Broderstad 2014, 72). Within, and across, these two systems of 
political governance, Broderstad further identifies three partially separate, partially over-
lapping spaces of political23 interaction: Indigenous, non-Indigenous, and (in the inter-
sections of the two) shared space of political interaction. Building on Williams’ work, the 
three spaces can also be viewed as correlating to the different groups’ citizenship 
identities, where the exclusive Indigenous (Sámi) and non-Indigenous (Norwegian, 
Finnish etc.) identities operate on each side of the shared space of political interaction, 
and interact, in the middle, to form a shared understanding of citizenship in accordance 
with Williams’ notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate.’
From a normative point of view, Broderstad’s model (like that of Williams) comes 
with several benefits. The two groups (in Broderstad’s case, the Indigenous Sámi and the 
non-Indigenous Norwegian majority) can both keep their distinctive identities, although 
their cooperation is characterized, and constrained, by their understanding of each other 
as partners. The common, shared spaces of interaction are, far from distinctively 
Indigenous or non-Indigenous spaces of political engagement, described as shared spaces 
of political cooperation within which the two groups interact, at least ideally, on equal 
terms.
From a descriptive point of view, however, this threefold model of Indigenous/non- 
Indigenous interaction may not be entirely accurate. The history of the Sámi struggles for 
justice, including the gradual, yet imperfect, recognition of Sámi rights to land and self- 
determination, and the institutionalization of consultation processes between the Sámi 
parliament and the State (Broderstad 2014: 74–77, see also Oskal 2001) tells a story of 
both success, but also of a genuine struggle through which the Sámi continue to make 
their voices heard in the broader, primarily non-Indigenous frameworks of the State. 
Given these historical facts, as well as the three normative side constraints discussed in 
the previous section, the shared spaces of interaction may not be viewed as equal, but 
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continue to be characterized by unequal relations of power. This, it should be noted, is 
the case even with the Nordic Sámi who, in relation to other Indigenous peoples, is often 
viewed as one of the success stories of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations. While in the 
three Nordic countries, the Indigenous Sámi can be seen to hold substantive power 
within Indigenous political spaces (e.g. spaces falling under the governance of the 
respective Sámi parliaments), as well as be able to have their voices heard in the non- 
Indigenous/shared spaces of interaction (e.g. national parliaments), the construction of 
these spaces nevertheless remains hierarchical and power laden. In order to see this, one 
only needs to look at the ways in which the Sámi Parliaments have been established. 
Rather than constituting a joined higher organ of decision-making across the Sápmi 
Nation,24 they continue to work relatively independently of one another, within the 
jurisdictions of their ‘host’-countries. The legal frameworks that protect the rights of the 
Sámi in the three countries are also different, depending on each country’s willingness to 
subscribe to the internationally recognized frameworks for Indigenous rights protection 
(the case of ILO169 providing perhaps the most obvious example in this regard).
It may, however, be argued that Broderstad’s model (along with that of Williams) aims 
to provide a normative framework for Indigenous/non-Indigenous cooperation that, 
while being sensitive to existing non-ideal circumstances, tries to provide normative 
guidance on how such cooperation should happen in practice. While I have nothing 
against such an interpretation, I have tried to show that, in order to be genuinely 
responsive to the non-ideal circumstances associated with the contemporary world, 
certain side constraints to the ways in which the Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations 
are developed must be in place. That is, the parties to the shared political spaces need to 
agree on certain basics concerning their historical interaction, as well as recognize that, 
far from being an ideal speech situation, their cooperation is power laden and asym-
metric. I believe that this acknowledgment of power asymmetries also has important 
implications to the ways in which Broderstad’s spaces of political interaction should be 
understood and developed further.
At the descriptive level, it should be noted that the three spaces of political interaction 
are not equal, but continue to be framed by the non-Indigenous models of institutional 
design that are biased in favor of the non-Indigenous majority. This is the case especially 
in relation to the common, shared space of political cooperation that continues to be 
characterized by unequal power relations and asymmetrical relations of dependence. It is, 
however, also the case in relation to the existing Indigenous political spaces that have, as 
I have tried to argue, also been developed with existing non-Indigenous frameworks (e.g. 
modern states and their distinctive legal structures) in mind. Far from constituting three 
relatively equal spaces of political interaction, the three spaces are (and continue to be, at 
least for the foreseeable future) heavily biased and structurally designed to protect the 
interests of the national majority at the expense of the interests and viewpoints of the 
Indigenous peoples.
This does not, of course, mean that the Indigenous involvement in the shared spaces of 
political interaction could not be developed further, or that such involvement could not 
also be pursued to strengthen Indigenous self-determination within distinctively 
Indigenous political spaces. Broderstad (2008, 2014; see also Murphy 2008) makes 
a strong case for Indigenous involvement also within broader state institutions. More 
interestingly, however, acknowledging past and present power relations may have 
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important implications when it comes to the normative design of Indigenous/non- 
Indigenous relations – i.e. the ways in which spaces of political cooperation, from the 
premises of today, should be constructed. Provided that Indigenous/non-Indigenous 
relations continue to be heavily tainted by unequal relations of power and dependency, 
a need to intervene in the status quo remains. Developing Broderstad’s model of the three 
spaces of political interaction further, the descriptive model should now be understood as 
having a heavy bias for the benefit of the national majority and non-Indigenous institu-
tional design. In order to counter this, however, it may not be enough to resort to a model 
where the different political spaces are viewed as equal, but to amend this normative 
model with substantive weight given to Indigenous perspectives. Notably, the acknowl-
edgment of unequal power provides strong incentives to support distinctive and exclu-
sive Indigenous political spaces as these are necessary for retaining and supporting 
Indigenous cultures and identities. There is, however, no equivalent case for supporting 
distinctively non-Indigenous political spaces as these are already prevalent and ingrained 
in the structural frameworks of present-day society. The new model of Indigenous/non- 
Indigenous cooperation would thus seem to include only two political spaces: Indigenous 
and shared, instead of the three spaces envisioned by Broderstad.
Returning to the concrete case of the Nordic (and especially Norwegian) Sámi, it is 
already possible to find developments that seem to support the idea of two – Indigenous 
and shared – political spaces, excluding predominantly non-Indigenous political space. It 
is nowadays recognized that Indigenous Sámi languages, cultures, and inheritances are 
an integral part of the history and heritage of Norway, and should thus also be addressed 
in, e.g. Norwegian educational institutions. This is also recognized in the new Norwegian 
core curriculum that states: ‘Sámi cultural heritage is part of Norway’s cultural heritage. 
Our shared cultural heritage has developed throughout history and must be carried 
forward by present and future generations’ (Regjeringen 2017, 7). Indigenous Sámi 
culture is viewed as an inherent part of Norway’s heritage, and any discussion of 
Norwegian culture that fails to include Indigenous Sámi culture ignores an important 
element of this heritage. While there is no doubt much work that remains, both at the 
level of educational design and at the level of grassroot action in schools and other 
educational institutions (cf. Sollid and Olsen 2019), such principled commitment to 
understanding, and teaching, shared history notably acknowledges the need to think of 
broader public spaces, including educational institutions, as distinctively shared spaces of 
Indigenous/non-Indigenous cooperation.
Even more importantly, as has been noted, one of the specific features of Indigenous 
citizenship is its dual (or multiple) character, as also demonstrated by the Nordic/ 
Norwegian Sámi contexts. The Indigenous Sámi are, undoubtedly, citizens of the 
Sápmi Nation, although they are also citizens, and full members, of the Norwegian (or 
Swedish, or Finnish) state. As a result, the broader spaces of political interaction at the 
state level become necessarily shared spaces of interaction as the Sámi are, by virtue of 
their citizenship in the modern state, entitled to exercise their agency also at this level. 
While understanding citizenship in terms of shared fate may thus allow the two groups 
(non-Indigenous Norwegians and Norwegian Sámi) to construct their relations from 
their own starting points, with a certain range of acceptable disagreement, acknowl-
edging the status quo provides certain constraints to the ways in which these relations are 
formulated. Firstly, as I have argued, intervening in existing power relations justifies the 
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need for exclusively Indigenous spaces of political engagement, such as the Sámi 
Parliaments in Nordic countries or, should the Indigenous Sámi so decide, an even 
further development of Indigenous institutions transcending modern state borders. 
Secondly, while the notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ may allow, and be based on, 
the presumption of the two groups as occupying different starting points and views of 
their future cooperation, this may not allow for the development of distinctively non- 
Indigenous political spaces, on par with the development of Indigenous spaces. To the 
contrary, the dual nature of Indigenous citizenship must also ensure that the broader 
political spaces, institutional structures, educational institutions, etc., are, by default, 
shared spaces of cooperation that strive to include Indigenous voices and viewpoints and, 
in due course, help alleviate the existing relations of power between non-Indigenous and 
Indigenous peoples.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed Melissa Williams’ notion of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ as 
a potentially inclusive and real-world responsive way of understanding Indigenous 
citizenship in a non-ideal world. I analyzed this notion in the light of Indigenous claims 
for justice and argued that, in order to do the work it sets out to do, ‘citizenship as shared 
fate’ needs to be variously constrained. I proposed three normative side constraints: 1) 
limits on the acceptable range of disagreement concerning the two groups’ views of 
history, 2) acknowledgment of the normative role of history for future cooperation, 
and 3) acknowledgment of existing power-relations between Indigenous and non- 
Indigenous peoples. Taking these three normative side-constraints into account, 
I discussed some of the practical implications of ‘citizenship as shared fate’ as it might 
apply to the Nordic/Sápmi context. Most notably, the acknowledgment of existing power 
relations can be seen to alter both the descriptive models of Indigenous/non-Indigenous 
relations (as inherently biased) and the normative models for mediating these biases. 
Instead of viewing Indigenous/non-Indigenous cooperation as incorporating three 
spaces of political interaction, ‘citizenship as shared fate,’ and the three normative side 
constraints, provide justification for the support of distinctively – and exclusively – 
Indigenous political spaces, while viewing the broader public arenas as inherently shared 
spaces of Indigenous/non-Indigenous cooperation.
Notes
1. On the possible incongruences between citizenship status and citizenship rights, see Joppke 
(2007).
2. On the challenges of creating dialogue between the two, see, e.g. Thomsons and Mayer 2013.
3. I say multiple, as in some cases, Indigenous peoples are citizens of more than two political 
units, as is the case of the Sámi of Finland and Sweden, for instance, who are not only 
citizens of the Sápmi nation and their respective modern state (Finland or Sweden), but also 
citizens of the European Union. Notably, the Sámi of Norway (or Russia) are not citizens of 
the European Union. I will discuss the case of the Indigenous Sámi in the Nordic context in 
more detail in part IV.
4. While the western liberal understandings of citizenship may well allow for Indigenous 
peoples to be (also) citizens of their Indigenous nations, this citizenship is often seen as 
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inherently secondary to the citizenship of the modern state that operates as the broader 
regulatory framework within which Indigenous citizenship may be manifested. This is also 
the case with contemporary international law (incl. UNDRIP – UN General Assembly 
2007). For reflections on the state-centricity of UNDRIP, see, e.g. Allen and Xanthaki 2011.
5. These range from the more theoretically oriented accounts for Indigenous rights justifica-
tion (see e.g. Nine 2012; Moore 2016; Stiltz 2019), to more empirically situated explorations 
to the present workings of Indigenous self-determination within international law and 
politics, as well as within individual liberal democratic states (cf. Kymlicka 2013; Woons 
2014; Lightfoot 2016; Kuokkanen 2019).
6. The notions of Citizen-plus (cf. Cairns 2000) and Citizen-minus (Mercer 2003) may help 
illustrate the ways in which Indigeneity (and Indigenous citizenship) has often been inter-
preted as an additional layer to modern state citizenship, with differentiated effects to the 
citizenship rights of Indigenous peoples.
7. For some prominent Indigenous scholarship on citizenship that takes an often critical 
approach to predominantly liberal frameworks, see e.g. Alfred (2009); Coulthard (2014); 
Hester (2001); Simpson (2011, 2017); Turner (2000, 2006).
8. Examples range from the common canon of political theory that often situates itself (both 
supportively and critically) in relation to the Kymlickan multiculturalism -inspired theories 
of Indigenous rights (for notable collections see e.g. Ivison, Patton, and Sanders 2000; 
Connolly 2016) to legal theoretical analyses of Indigenous rights in international treaties 
and documents (e.g. Allen and Xanthaki 2011; Richardson, Imai, and McNeil 2009), 
including also many Indigenous scholars who situate their work within the liberal frame-
work (e.g. Broderstad 2008, 2014). I will return to Broderstad’s analysis of the shared 
political spaces of Indigenous/non-Indigenous cooperation in Section IV.
9. Kymlicka (1989): 154; For critical discussion, see Turner (2006): 58, 118.
10. My discussion here rests predominantly on Williams’ work; for alternative formulations, 
see, e.g. Ben-Porath (2011); Merry (2012).
11. In this article, I use the term ‘Indigenous claims for justice’ as an umbrella term that includes 
a variety of both theoretical, as well as more practical, approaches to Indigenous claims to, 
e.g. land, resources and self-determination, as well as Indigenous resurgence more generally, 
in different contexts. While Indigenous claims for justice and, in particular, the proposed 
means to achieve such justice are context dependent (cf. Lenzerini 2009), some of the main 
normative bases for such claims in historical, as well as enduring, injustices remains 
relatively constant.
12. Williams uses the term ‘civic national’ as the counterpart to ‘ethnic national’ understandings 
of citizenship, and debates the Rawlsian political liberal understanding of citizenship as 
a prominent example of such a view (Rawls 1996). From here on, I will thus use the two 
terms – civic national and political liberal – interchangeably, although I recognize that other 
forms of civic nationalism than the Rawlsian political liberal notions also exist.
13. This is not to say that understanding citizenship in terms of shared fate would not have 
certain normative implications (it certainly does and I will come back to these later). For the 
time being, my focus is on the potential benefits of viewing ‘citizenship as shared fate’ in 
descriptive and pragmatic terms.
14. These variations may be partially explained by dual citizenships as also opening opportu-
nities for strategic citizenship, but also by the effects of one’s surroundings, historical 
policies of assimilation, as well as on the current conceptualizations of what it means to 
be Indigenous and a member of the broader modern state. On reflections on the case of the 
Norwegian Sámi, see e.g. Semb (2012); Selle, Semb, and Strømsnes (2013).
15. This is not to suggest that the non-Indigenous and Indigenous peoples of any given state 
would not have cooperated or worked with one another previously, but simply that the 
prevailing situation operates, inevitably, as the situation upon which cooperation – at any 
given moment – must be built upon.
16. On the relevance of historical injustices for Indigenous claims for justice, including the 
possible conditions for superseding such injustices, see Waldron (1992); Patton (2005); 
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Sanderson (2011); Føllesdal (2013); Waligore (2016); On international and comparative 
legal perspectives, see Lenzerini (2009); Richardson, Imai, and McNeil (2009).
17. On the implications of such power relations with respect to the ways in which dialogue 
between different groups is constructed, see, e.g. James (2013).
18. A distinction between moral equality and, e.g. economic inequality may help to underscore this 
point. Even if all members of different groups – including (although not restricted to) 
Indigenous peoples and the national majority – would be considered as morally equal, their 
points of entry into society may still be characterized as incorporating various economic and 
other inequalities reflected by, e.g. an unequal distribution of resources. See also Williams (2000): 
60.
19. I will restrict my discussion to the Nordic Sámi, excluding the Sámi of Russia, as the 
institutional structures of the three Nordic countries can be seen as relatively similar, 
while the inclusion and treatment of the Indigenous Sámi in Russia has fallen substantively 
behind. This difference is also reflected in the Draft Nordic Sámi Convention (2005) that 
provides guidelines for Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations in the three Nordic countries, 
but excludes the Sámi of Russia.
20. For example, in Norway, one of the largest singular concentrations of the Sámi is in the 
capital Oslo, although the northern areas of Troms and Finnmark continue to rate as places 
with the highest proportional number of Sámi. (Sønstebø 2018)
21. I have discussed some problems associated with protecting such ‘cross-border groups’ 
elsewhere (Vitikainen 2019); For a historical overview of the division of the Sámi across 
four states, see Lantto (2010).
22. This interpretation of the Sámi as one people follows that of the Draft Nordic Sámi 
Convention 2005.
23. While Broderstad focuses primarily on the spaces of political interaction, the model can also 
be used to analyze, and incorporate, other spaces of e.g. social, cultural and economic 
interaction, as well as ways in which the collective identities (of both Sámi and non-Sámi) 
are formed.
24. My intention here is not to provide any normative judgment of whether Indigenous 
decision making should, or should not, be constructed in this way, but simply to point to 
the ways in which modern state-centric structures operate in the background of current 
institutions involving Indigenous decision-making processes.
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